Kort biografi


Dokumentation


s. 196-197

“The extremely difficult problem faced by women in their attempt to win full citizenship I shall call “Wollstonecraft’s dilemma”. The dilemma is that the two routes towards citizenship that women have pursued are mutually incompatible within the confines of the patriarchal welfare state, and, within that context, they are impossible to achieve. For three centuries, since universal citizenship first appeared as a political ideal, women have continued to challenge their alleged natural subordination within private live. From at least the 1790s they have also struggled with the task of trying to become citizens within an ideal and practice that have gained universal meaning through their exclusion. Women’s response has been complex. On the one hand they have demanded that the ideal of citizenship be extended to them, and the liberal-feminist agenda for a “gender-neutral” social world is the logical conclusion of one form of this demand. On the other hand, women have also insisted, often simultaneously, as did Mary Wollstonecraft, that as women they have specific capacities, talents, needs and concerns, so that the expression of their citizenship will be
differentiated from that of men. Their unpaid work providing welfare could be seen, as Wollstonecraft saw women’s tasks as mothers, as women’s work as citizens, just as their husbands’ paid work is central to men’s citizenship.

The patriarchal understanding of citizenship means that the two demands are incompatible because it allows two alternatives only: either woman become (like) men, and so full citizens; or continue at women’s work, which is of no value for citizenship. Moreover, within a patriarchal welfare state neither demand can be met. To demand that citizenship, as it now exists, should be fully extended to women accepts the patriarchal meaning of “citizen”, which is constructed from men’s attributes, capacities, and activities. Women cannot be full citizens in the present meaning of the term; at best, citizenship can be extended to women only as lesser men. At the same time, within the patriarchal welfare estate, to demand proper social recognition and support for women’s responsibilities is to condemn women to less than full citizenship and to continued incorporation into public life as “women”, that is, as members of another sphere who cannot, therefore, earn the respect of fellow (male) citizens.

p. 202-203.

..If women as well as men are to be full citizens, the separation of welfare state and employment from the free welfare work contributed by women has to be broken down and new meaning and practices of “independence”, “work”, and “welfare” created.

For example, consider the implications were a broad, popular political movement to press for welfare policy to include a guaranteed social income to all adults, which would provide adequately for subsistence and also participation in social life. For such a demand to be made, the old dichotomies must already have started to break down – the opposition between paid and unpaid work (for the first time all individuals could have a genuine choice whether to engage in paid work), between full- and part-time work, between public and private work, between independence and dependence, between work and welfare – which is to say, between men and women. If implemented, such a policy would at last recognize women as equal members of the welfare state, although it would not in itself ensure women’s full citizenship. If a genuine democracy is to be
created, the problem of the content and value of women’s contribution as citizenship has to be confronted.

Pateman, Carole (2003), Freedom and Democratization: Why Basic Income is to be Preferred to Basic Capital, Chapter for The Ethics of Stakeholding, (eds) Keith Dowding, Jurgen De Wispelaere, and Stuart White, Palgrove, London.

“My argument will be that, from the perspective of democratization, a basic income should be seen as a fundamental or democratic right, like universal suffrage. This is because a basic income would help remove impediments to freedom, help citizens enjoy and exercise citizenship, and help provide the security required if citizenship is to be of equal worth to everyone. My understanding of individual freedom is as self-government or autonomy. I see this as a political form of freedom in contrast to an economic form of freedom as individual opportunity. The latter is necessary in a democracy, but is insufficient for democratization, the political process through which all citizens obtain full standing, and become first class – democratic – citizens.

As a democratic right a basic income has the potential to assist democratization because, unlike basic capital, it can help break the long-standing link between income, marriage, employment, and citizenship. Both basic income and a stake would enlarge individual opportunities, but the opportunities provided by a basic income would be much wider. A major difference between the two forms of stakeholding is that a basic income would give citizens the freedom not to be employed. A basic income opens up two possibilities important for democratization. First, it would encourage citizens to reflect on the place of the institution of employment in a democracy; second, it has the potential to foster institutional change and uncouple standard of life and citizenship from employment…

.. Universal suffrage is the emblem of equal citizenship, and a basic income is the emblem of full standing as a citizen, of citizenship that is of equal worth….
By a democratic right I have in mind a fundamental right in Henry Shue’s (1996) sense of a right that is essential if other rights are to be enjoyed. A basic income as a democratic right can be compared to the suffrage, another fundamental right. Universal suffrage underpins an orderly change of government through free and fair elections, and so enhances citizens’ security, and enables each citizen to share in collective self-government. A basic income provides the security required to maintain full standing as a citizen, and enables each citizen to exercise individual self-government.

But a basic income would do more than this. If it allowed citizens to live at a modest but decent standard, they could “take time off” to, for example, do voluntary work, develop their political capacities and skills, learn to surf, to write or paint, devote themselves to family life – or undertake caring work - or just have a period of selfreassessment or contemplation. By loosening the tie between marriage, income, and employment, a basic income can assist, in a way that basic capital for young people cannot, in removing impediments to freedom. It would allow individuals more easily to refuse to enter or to leave relationships that violate individual self-government, or that involve unsafe, unhealthy, or demeaning conditions.


http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/pateman/politicsandsociety.pdf

..”I became interested in the idea of a basic income some years ago for two main reasons. First, because of the part that basic income could play in furthering democratization, i.e. the creation of a more democratic society in which individual freedom and citizenship are of equal worth for everyone. The second, and closely related, reason is because of its potential in advancing women’s freedom. My argument is that in light of these reasons a basic income is preferable to a stake. A basic income is a crucial part of any strategy for democratic social change because, unlike a capital grant, it could help break the long-standing link between income and employment, and end the mutual
One reason for the democratic potential of a basic income is that it would provide an important opportunity; namely, the freedom not to be employed. Participants in the debates about a basic income tend to skirt round this distinctive implication, but, as I shall argue, it is central to its democratizing possibilities – providing that the income is set at an appropriate level. Neither the idea of a basic income or a capital grant say anything about the level at which they should be set. The level proposed will depend on the reasons for supporting such proposals. My assumption is that, for a basic income to be relevant for democratization, it should be adequate to provide what I call a modest but decent standard of life. This is a level sufficient to allow individuals to have some control over the course of their lives, and to participate to the extent that they wish in the cultural, economic, social, and political life of their polity.

My argument is that a basic income should be seen, like the suffrage, as a democratic right, or a political birthright. By a “democratic” right I have in mind a fundamental right in Henry Shue’s sense of a “basic right”. Basic rights “specify the line beneath which no one is to be allowed to sink”. Rights are basic “if enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights.” Subsistence is one of Shue’s basic rights, which he defines as “what is needed for a decent chance at a reasonably healthy and active life of more or less normal length, barring tragic interventions.” Building on this line of argument, a basic income, at a level sufficient for a modest but decent standard of life, can be seen as a fundamental or democratic right. Such an income is necessary to enable all citizens to participate as fully as they wish in all aspects of the life of their society.

A basic income would have two important consequences for democratization. First, it would allow individuals more easily to refuse to enter or to leave relationships that violate individual self-government, or that involve unsafe, unhealthy, or demeaning conditions.

A basic income would also support citizens’ participation in collective self-government by opening up opportunities for citizens to develop their political capacities and skills. A guaranteed
standard of life would mean that participation in social and political life would not require heroic efforts on the part of any citizens.

The second consequence, and a crucial difference between basic income and stakeholding, is that a basic income would give citizens the freedom not to be employed. Both a basic income, if set at the appropriate level, and a capital grant would provide enlarged opportunities for individuals, but the opportunities provided by a basic income would be far wider than those offered by a stake, since the new opportunities would not be confined to the competitive market. A basic income, like a stake, would make it possible for anyone (at any point in their life, not merely while they are young) to go back to school, to retrain for a new occupation, or to open a business. But a basic income providing a modest but decent standard of living would do much more…

.. By opening up this range of opportunities and uncoupling income and standard of life from employment, a basic income has the potential both to encourage critical reassessment of the mutually reinforcing structures of marriage, employment and citizenship, and to open the possibility that these institutions could be re-made in a new, more democratic form…

… Again, to support basic income on the grounds that it would improve the living standards of the poorest sectors of the population does not promote consideration of the structural connections between marriage, employment, and citizenship, and the private and public sexual division of labor. Without the debates about basic income being informed by feminist arguments, and a concern for democratization (and genuine democratization necessarily includes women’s freedom and standing as citizens), the discussion will revolve around ways of tinkering with the existing system rather than encouraging thinking about how it might be made more democratic…

… A basic income is important for feminism and democratization precisely because it is paid not to households but *individuals as citizens*. A focus on individuals does not imply resort to the atomistic individualism of neo-classical economics. The problem of women’s self-government
and full standing as citizens is visible only when individuals are conceptualized within the context of social relations and institutions. A household-based basic income allows the problem of marriage, employment, and citizenship to be avoided since wives (women) disappear into the category of “the family” or “household”. To treat a basic income as a payment to households rather than individuals ignores the question of who performs the work of caring for household members. That is, it is tacitly assumed that reciprocity exists and that free-riding is only a problem about men avoiding employment.”